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PREREQUISITES TO A PROPER STUDY OF SCIENCE. 
BY CHARLES SIMPSON, M. D. 
[Uead before the Academy December I, 1813.] 
The subject upon which I have decided to invite your atten-
tion, is not one which belongs strictly to any one department of 
Science. It is, rather, the outgrowth of my own perplexities, 
in cla3..~ifying the various disjointed items of scientific interest, 
aRd appropriating them as part of my own mental outfit, and 
concerns the whole subject of scientific investigation. Regard-
ing the observations which I shall make in this paper, my stand-
point may be assumed to be on the boundary wall which 
encloses and overlooks the broad domain of Science, from which 
I am able to inspect the designs, progress and proficiency of 
the vast multitude of workmen, as they toil unweariedly at their 
respective tasks. From such a survey, it may be supposed that 
while the greater part of the operations excites admiration and 
astonishment, there may be, on the other hand, much that calls . 
up a suspicion that a great deal of labor and enthusiasm has 
been either wasted or misapplied. 
Method, in the accomplishment of any work, in any given 
field, is of the first importance. It is a waste of energy in the 
workman to enter upon his labor without, in the first place, 
having a definite notion, not only of the grand object he has 
in view, but also of the means by which he hopes to attain his 
end, and the limits of his capacity in the employment of the 
means. In the building of any structure, it is not only neces-
sary that the mechanic should have a knowledge of its length, 
breadth and height, the style of architecture and adornment, 
he must, as necessarily, have considered the kind and form of 
his materials, and their adequacy to meet the requirements of 
the original design. So, in every sphere in which labor is' ex· 
pended, it is always obligatory on one, to so far understand the 
matter in hand, as to secure, as far as may be, the successful 
issue of his undertaking, and prevent the waste of his energies 
. in disgraceful and disheartening failure. 
Digitized by Coogle 
Prereqttisitt'S to .... a 
For a long period in the world's history, Science made little 
or no· progress. Literature and the arts flourished side by side 
with dazzling brilliancy, ages before systematic knowledge of 
physical nature had even a name or a place. True, facts were 
known, or, rather, things were believed which have since been 
shown to be facts; but what we, to-day, understand as Sci'nu:~ 
is a thing of comparatively modem birth-a product of the 
world's maturer years and wiser thoughts. The wildest imag-
ination, the dreamiest speculation and sober truth, may be 
said to have weltered together in utter chaos, until the advent 
of the scientific method of investigation, promulgated by the 
matchless genius of Bacon, placed truth on surer footing and 
in reputable company. The inductive or experimental method 
made science a possibility. Without it, the best minds of earth 
all but frittered away their strength in striving to reach the un-
attainable, and succeeded in making nothing so conspicuous as 
the folly of their attempt. My present object, however, is not 
to describe, in detail, either of the two great systems of logic, 
but to hint briefly at certain prerequisites to a successful, vigor-
ous and healthy progress in the cultivation of scientific thought, 
and to point out as clearly as may be, the dangers attending 
the indiscriminate use or the willful abuse of the two most pow-
erful weapons in the armory of knowledge-speculation and 
experiment. 
Among scientific men, and, indeed, in all men, we find this 
difference in mental bias : One man has a predilection for ob-
serving and collating individual, and, perhaps, entirely isolated 
facts, caring little for the arrangement of these so as to embody 
a general truth or law ; while another, caring less for what to 
him are tedious details, spreads at once the win~s of his imag-
ination and soars to a bold hypothesis, which it may take ages 
either to verify or condemn. Such tendencies among our 
leaders in science-the representatives of the different modes 
are readily identified-are constantly apparent .to every one 
conversant with the scientific literature of the day. Now, in 
science, as in religion and politics, we have, as in the nature of 
things we must have, both leaders and followers, and the latter 
from the same necessity, must vastly outnumber the former. 
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But it is really no disparagement to the large body of scientific 
workers, who are properly credited with knowing something of 
physics, geolog:,·, botany, archeology, etc., to say that they are 
after all, nothing but smatterers-dependants who are compel-
led to rc: ly for their scientific sustenance on masters, who are 
liable, like all mortals, to be swayed by the human infirmities 
of _ambition, jealousr and caprice. It would be asking too much 
of the average amateur scientist, to require that he should be 
able to verify all the data upon which the various scientific con-
clusions are supposed to depend. He must take things at sec-
ood hand, if he wo~ld have hi!' knowledge possess a respectable 
appearance of scope. He must allow the exercise of that faculty 
of our mentality which has been denominated respectively, 
faith, hero-worship and credulity, in order to have even interest 
enough in the subjeet to fairly comprehend what others are 
doing in contributing to the aggregate of knowledge. But he 
must have a care-he ought to be in possession of some standard 
which lu can use, in testing the reliability or otherwise, of 
the various things which are handed down to him by his 
superiors, and thus avoid the mortification of having, at some 
future day, to recant a dC!ctrine of which, at one time, he may 
have been a noisy advocate-or, the other equally disagreeable 
predicament of clinging fondly and blindly to a view which the 
rest of the world shall have long ago completely outgrown. 
To guard against being imposed upon by new and dazzling 
generalizations, and to check the impetuosity of that Pickwick-
ian infatuation which is aroused, oftentimes, by t:he bare idea 
of something new, it seems to me, a familiarity with, and a clear 
conception of the following fundamenlals would be of much 
practical importance, viz : 1. The limits of our knowlidge. 
2. What Science demands as evidence. 3· The sphere of 
hypothesis. 
1. That there are certain limits to our knowledge, either de-
finite or vaguely defined is a fact that has been long recognized 
by a few. But, like other great truths pertaining either to 
physical nature or the laws of thought, the full demonstration 
ofthe Relativity of all knowledge is a thing of but recent date. 
At the present day, all thinkers recognize the truth of this 
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fundamental proposition, but like many other abstruse deduc-
tions, its clearness and force are not felt by th.e mass of average 
intelligent persons, unless a necessity or accident of discussion 
has, here and there driven some to its careful consideration. 
Sir William Hamilton, I believe, ha& the honor of first present-
ing the subject with clearness and philosophic accuracy, and 
insisting on it~ recognition as one of the landmarks of true 
philosophy. Others since his time, have re:.presented the argu-
ment-foremost among the number Herbert Spencer, perhaps, 
the most gigantic thinker of modern times, who supplements 
Hamilton's reasonings by others, which, tog~ther, produce such 
mpmentum, that cavil is well nigh impossible. Briefly statl!d, 
the doctrine only insists that ktfowledge, properly so-called, is 
limited to phenomena-their relations,likenesses and differences. 
When we attempt to go beyond this, to pass from appearances 
to the constitution of the thing, we find ourselves hedged about 
by . insurmountable difficulties, and if we seem to ourselves to 
make some progress, we are, at last, involved in absurdities of 
thought. For example: we attempt to gain a conception of 
matter, and select, say-a bar of iron for the purpose; we enum-
erate all the various attributes which are supposed to be sn-
herent in the metal ; we say it has extension-it occupies so 
much space-it has color, density, temperature, and so on, citing 
all the conceivable properties which can belong to it, and yet, 
we have obtained a knowledge of nothing except the attributes, 
and of these, only their relations to each other as states of con-
sciousne<;s. We are no farther advanced, in· our search for the 
reality in matter, we are still conscious that something, we 
know not what, has elueed us. Shall we say that matter is the 
sum of its attributes, and that if all its attributes were known, 
the sum of such would be matter? The bare statement shows 
the absurdity of s~ch an idea. By no effort, can we think of 
the mere attribute of a thing as being a constituent part of the 
thing itself, any more than we can think of the shadow as being 
a part of the substance. The substance of matter is utterly in-
comprehensible to us, and remains so after exhausting evl!ry 
expedient. But, suppose we try to grasp the reality in matter 
by assuming, after the manner of modern chemistry, that it is 
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made up of infinitesimally small parti'c!es, which shall be named 
atoms, surrounded by an atmosphere of space or force or some-
thing else, we find ourselves in even a worse predicament than 
before, for, besides the old difficulty, . we have drawn into the 
case various unthinkable suppositions, and although we have 
transferred our conceptions from the sensible t.o the insensible, 
have finally to think of atoms as having extension, resistance, 
etc, which leaves us in the mazes of the same labyrinth which 
perplexed us before. All we can know of the absolute ln mat-
ter, is comprehended in the following query by Prof. Huxley: 
"For what, after all," he asks, "do we know of this terrible 
matter except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical 
cause of states of our own consciousness?" A similar, or if pos-
sible, greater difficulty may be encountered, if we would seek 
to realize in thought, the ultimate nature of force. We can 
state safely that we know nothing whatever of force except 
from its relation to matter, and conversely, we have no knowl-
edge of matter apart from some one or more of the phases of 
force. If we define force as that power in matter which acts, 
we only express a phenomenon, and are still in the dark as to 
its absolute nature and its connection with matter. The fact that 
we are entir y incapable of thinking of the one as existing in-
dependently of the other may point to their indissoluble relation 
as factors, whose product is that external reality of which we 
are at all times vaguely conscious; but granting. that, their real 
nature is even yet so far beyond our scrutiny, that look in what-
ever direction we may, every effort to pierce the impenetrable 
mystery that surrounds them, invariably results in disappoint-
ment. We might, if we chose, find ourselves similarly circum. 
stanced with regard to motion, time and space, as Spencer has 
done with such clearness and percision, but the above suf-
ficiently illustrates the limits beyond which our knowledge can-
not go. a. 
It is to be regretted that those well defined limitations are 
not more industriously kept before the minds of readers, 
writers and speakers. Much valuable time might be saved, 
much contention avoided, much nonsense left unuttered, were 
it possible to convince many of our scientific men and the 
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majority of theobgians, that the nature of matter, force and 
the final cause, are subjects which they know nothing at all 
about. While we cannot conceive of the absolute .at all, nor 
form the faintest resemblance to a rational idea of matter or its 
correlative force, what is gained, it may well be asked, by dis-
cussing such que!tions as the identity of matter and force, or 
advancing theories which dt:mand us to think of the latter as 
existin~ independently of the former? All such proceedings 
are indicative of an untamed imagination, and are at once 
futile and suicidal. We are fast approaching the time when 
men who in many respects are justly entitled to be called 
scientific, sho4ld .:ease to believe that they believe, and instead, 
betake themselves, in the first place, to a diligent tracing out 
of the limits which circumscribe all knowledge, and secondly, 
to an earnest exploration of the territory within the boundary 
line, a very large part of which is still a terra incognita, 
leaving the vast and impenetrable area beyond to a time when 
our faculties may be reinforcf"d by others fitted to the under-
taking. The development of the argument on which the 
doctrine of the Relativity of our knowledge is securely based, 
has not been my intention, neither would it be admissible 
within the scope of the present paper. If I have succeeded 
in ">howing, or even in drawing attention to the fact, that its 
recognition lies at the very foundation of scientific inquiry, I 
have done all that was intended. 
2. What science demands as evidence is equally important, 
the lines. of limitation as sharply drawn, and its constant 
recognition as imperative as the foregoing. The laws of evi-
dence that ·are recognized as of universal application are, of 
course, also the guides in all ma:tters pertaining to science. 
There are, however, certain modifications in details, some con-
firmatory steps insisted upon, that may be considered peculiar 
to the Sc;ientific method. It may be affirmed, at the outset, 
that science is not satisfied with an a priori conclusion. She 
must have verification by actual test before she will affix the 
label, on which the word fact is written in striking characters. 
In a word, experiment is the final test of all things that are 
susceptible of positive knowledge. 
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To give a familiar instance of the rigidness and exactness 
required by that part of the scientific world which constitutes 
authority, before any new fact is registered as such, we cannot 
do better than to refer to the past and present status of the 
doctrine of spontaneous generation. That all life comes from 
life, has been alternately accepted and rejected, as the results 
of experiments differed in the hands of different investigators. 
Until a year or two ago, the question stood by common con-
sent 'not proven,' as illustrated by the words of Prof .• Huxley 
when he says: "All I feel justified in affirming is, that I see 
no reason for believing thac the feat has been performed yet." 
Quite recently, however, the same experiments have been per-
formed, all the previous precautions observed-the manipula-
tions as delicate and exact as before-and the outcome would 
seem to favor the idea, that life may come spontaneously, and 
the dictum omne vivt~m ex vi110 not true after all. What the 
next campaign shall disclose, which side of the controversy 
shall seem to have the victory, it would be rash for any one to 
predict. Now, if these oscillations in the results of these fre-
quently recurring series of experiments prove anything at alh 
they prove the immense difficulty and the great tendency to 
error, which attach to this question. The mere fact that Dr. 
Bastian has instituted experiments to show that in a solution 
in which there was no life, and into which no germs could 
come, so far as he was able to exclude them, low forms of life 
may appear; and has succeeded in satisfying himself and some 
others, that spontaneous generation is possible-all this I say, 
is not all that Science demands of these witnesses. There 
must be repetition of those experi"ments, not only by Dr. Bas-
tian, but by others, whose names have not been pledged to the 
support of the doctrine; a certain length of time must elapse, 
to give biased minds an opportunity to resume an equilibrium, 
and for cool judgment to review the evidence; and it must be 
finally shown that under certain conditions life always and 
invariably comes spontaneously. Then, and not till then, will 
it be time to declare that it is a law of Nature to generate life 
anew, and that that was probably the way by which life first 
appeared on our planet. We must await the result with pa-
• 
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tience, for we have no good reason to expect that a decision 
will be pronounced very soon, but come when it may, the sub-
ject must be viewed with calmness and impartiality-the only 
enthusiasm that can be tolerated with impunity, being that 
which proceeds from an eagerness to know the truth, and that 
alone. 
As has been already intimated, it is held to be just as pos-
sible in Science as in a court of justice, that a witnes.'l may be 
mistakeft, or may prevaricate. Hence, the testimony of one 
man, or the results of his investigations, are not taken as final, 
but are subjected over and over again to cross-examination. 
In the history of experimentation, it is the rule, rather than t}?e 
exception, that the results of one man's labor are corrected by 
his successors, and theirs in turn by others, and so on, perhaps, 
through a long succession of alternation~ before the stamp of 
certainty can be impressed on the result. When we take into 
consideration the conflicting testimony concerning any trivial 
incident of common life, which, from its con~ection with some 
wrong done to society, finds its way to the presence of a judge 
and jury, it is a matter of no surprise, and it is no disparagement 
to Science· to confess, that her followers often receive different 
impressions from the observation ofthe same thing. It simply 
shows that some men have powers of observation that are 
either not originally sufficient, or are not adequately developed 
to prevent them from falling into that far too common blunder 
of "viewing things unequally." All that concerns us now, is 
to know that such is the case, so that due caution may be 
exercised in the bestowal pf .credence. Amateur scientists, 
especially, cannot afford to ignore the safeguard which the 
veteran finds in the indulgence of habitual scepticism. Wit-
ness, for instance, the cool reception which the English men of 
Science tendered to the report of Crookes and his colleagues-
the committee who undertook to formulate the phenomena of 
modern spiritualism as presented by Home, the celebrated me-
dium. This committee announced the discovery of a "psychic 
force," on the strength, it would appear, of their failure to 
convict Home of trickery and humbug. No one, of course, 
was prepared to say that there is no such thing as " psychic 
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force" in Nature; for, while so little of Nature is known, it 
would be sublime presumption to specify wltat tltere is not, but 
it ~as held, and very justly, to be presumption equally auda-
cious, and a lack of common prudence in a shocking degree, 
to trumpet the discovery of a new force on such meagre data, 
or rather, on no data at all. The proper report for this com-
mitte!! to have made, which, however, would not have been 
quite· so flattering to the enthusiasts in whose interest they 
were, perhaps, unconsciously enlisted, would have been, that 
they knew nothing what'ever about the matter-which after 
all, when properly rendered, is just what this expression "psy-
chic force" amounts to. Their mistake partook somewhat of 
the post !toe propter !toe fallacy-but with elements in it even 
more inexcusable-which mistakes coincidence for cause and 
effect, as the savage who thus associates comets and eclipses 
with dire calamities, or the parent or friend who attributes 
recovery from a dangerous illness to the exhibition of some 
harmless, inert medicine. To conclude, however, this part 
of my subject: the kind of evidence which Science insists upon 
are facts, and to determine what shall be recognized as facts, 
she has decreed that all experiments shall be tested and re-
tested ; that all observations shall be repeated over and over, 
not only by the original observer, but by a "cloud of witnesses," 
and to guard more effectually against the occasional intrusion 
of error, she has retained the services of that great assayer of 
all things-Time. 
The classification and generalization of facts so as to form a 
general law or idea, properly belongs to what shall be ~aid of 
Hypothesis. 
3· Our idea of cause and effect is intuitive, or at all events, 
we are unable to conceive of anything as being uncaused. 
The knowledge . of a fact, therefore, naturally brings with it 
the inquiry as to its cause, or the phenomena lying back of it 
and unperceived. As Science advances and observers become 
more numerous and more watchful, the number of accredited 
facts increases with rapidity, and as their causation is not 
always apparent, would remain, in a great measurt;, useless and 
repulsive, were not some expedient at hand to rescue them 
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from inutility and, perhaps, oblivion. The knowledge of a 
solitary fact, or of a group of solitary facts, of itself does 
not furnish that satisfaction which the intellect is continually 
reaching after. The tendency of the' mind is to form for itself 
some arrangement of its facts for the purpose of gaining an 
itka, or in other words, a general cause, or something that is 
uniformly associated with phenomena and underlie them. 
Here is seen the value, indeed, the necessity, of hypothesis. 
As facts of kindred nature are aggregated, and. their relations 
to each other noted, the mind at once endeavors to assign 
them to one common cause, or to consider them as the mani-
festations of some general method of natural procedure or 
law. The imagination reaches out on all sides for something, 
which shall solve the numerous problems thu!; presented to 
the intellect, or at all events, for something that shall answer 
as a foundation upon which a superstructure may be reared, of 
such ample dimensions that every fact may be embodied and 
used in its construction. Rarely, indeed, has the imagination 
failed to do something of this kind. Many a frail edifice has 
been built, and soon has tottered to the ground in ruins, but 
always to be rebuilt with more caution and improved skill, 
until, at length, many a noble temple rears its dome heaven-
ward, the wonder of the uninitiated and the delight of the 
devotee. 
The history of hypothesis from its first appearance as an aid 
to the struggling and bewildered mind, in its search for knowl-
edge, down to these latt::r times, when the scientific imagination 
has become so powerful and acute as well nigh to usurp the 
province of sober reason, would make a volume as ponderous 
as it would be curious and instructive. The phenomena of 
the heavens-the motions of the planets and their moons, 
eclipses, comets and meteors-were among the earliest perplex-
ities to science, and, in turn, we have in astronomy, the Ptole-
maic and Copernican tluorus. The curious behaviour of solids, 
fluids and gases under certain conditions, prompted the inqui-
ries, which, by and by, developed into alchemy, and, finally, 
into that stupendous monument of human labor-modern 
chemistry, alongside of which, and in many places pervading 
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its very substance, we find the atomtc tlteory. The observations 
made on the rocks which form the substratum of our soil, out 
of which has grown the science of Geology, have also given 
birth to the Neptunian and Plutonic theories of the earth, and 
the theory which amalgamates the two, and assisted materially 
in the construction of that most sweeping generalization of 
facts of. which we have any idea-the ntbular ltypotlusis. The 
phenomena attending life and its propagation, the deviations 
from the rule that like begets like, and the curious diversity of 
species to be accounted for, have necessitated the tVolution 
ltypotlttsis and the included hypothesis of Darwin. We have 
an undulation theory, and with it the subtle, undefinable, in-
comprehensible etlter; we have forces of all kinds-attractive, 
repulsive and "tangential," these again subdivided all the way 
from gravitation 'to the vital and so-called psychic force, and 
we may have them all correllated or not just as we choose. 
In fact, all departments have their theories ; they constitute 
the scaffolding by which we are enabled to lay stone upon stone 
on the walls of the uncompleted temple of knowledge. It is, 
nevertheless,salutary employment to the mind, to pause occasion-
ally among these colossal structures of the imagination, and ask 
seriously and honestly, what relation they bear to substantial re-
ality; whether they are calculated to stand the test of time and 
weather, or like the house that was built upon the sand, are in 
danger of tumbling into hopeles!> ruin when the first storm 
shall assail them. It is wholesome, at short intervals, to pon-
der well first principles, especially when we feel ourselves prone 
to take for granted what neither we nor anybody else has pre-
tended to prove. w ·e have become so familiar with theory, 
having associated with it from our youth up, that it is often 
difficult to persuade ourselves that it is only at best a shadow 
-and often may not be even that. Therefor<!, 1 say, it is well, 
betimes, to cultivate assiduously first principles, to eliminate 
theory from our hoarded knowledge, and the'h look aghast at 
the residuum. However much we may wish a theory to 
be true, however hard we may labor to prove it so, and 
to con~ince ourselves and others that it is so, we are deceiving 
ourselves most bitterly if we cannot comprehend that hypoth-
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esis is nothing more than a kind of tentative knowledge-
a mere ruse to satisfy the mind for the time being until it shall 
have made a better investment. 
It seems to me that we must have reached the climax in the 
age of speculation in science-so far as this century is con-
cerned. There is an evident disgust arising among the wisest 
of our best men for the mass of unwarranted theorizing which 
the last few years have accumulated, and the disastrou~ resqlts 
which have accrued to the mass of scientific underlings who 
have not always clearly apprehended the sphere of pure 
hypothesis, nor deported themselves with that moderation 
which becomes the conscientious student vf Nature. Facts 
must have both number and strength, before even the attempt 
should be made to string them on a theory. The oldest and 
strongest theories known to science will hardly bear the strain 
which a vigorous panic may soon bring upon them. A series 
of able articles in the Popular Science Montkl,y on "The Primary 
Concepts of Modern Science" has already given evidence bow 
much even the widely known and generally trusted atomic 
theory may suffer from a vigorous onslaught. Epochs of con-
vulsion and upheaval must come, as master minds in tum 
sway the opinions of the scientific world. A Newton or 
a Bacon may be among us, almost ready to appear, and it may 
be of some consolation to each humble devotee of Nature to 
be assured, in his own mind, that he has marked well the 
boundaries of his knowledge, and has given his unqualified al-
. legiance to no untried, unsubstantial speculation. 
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